<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>GRID THE GREY — AI Threat Intelligence | GRID THE GREY</title><link>https://gridthegrey.com/</link><description>Real-time AI security intelligence — adversarial ML, LLM vulnerabilities, and supply chain threats mapped to MITRE ATLAS and OWASP LLM Top 10.</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><copyright/><lastBuildDate>Fri, 08 May 2026 08:44:08 +0530</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://gridthegrey.com/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Claude Mythos AI-Assisted Fuzzing Uncovers 423 Firefox Security Bugs in One Month</title><link>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/ai-assisted-fuzzing-uncovers-423-firefox-security-bugs-in-one-month/</link><pubDate>Fri, 08 May 2026 03:13:53 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/ai-assisted-fuzzing-uncovers-423-firefox-security-bugs-in-one-month/</guid><category>Threat Level: HIGH</category><category>Research</category><category>Industry News</category><category>LLM Security</category><category>Agentic AI</category><category>AML.T0040 - ML Model Inference API Access</category><category>AML.T0047 - ML-Enabled Product or Service</category><category>AML.T0043 - Craft Adversarial Data</category><description>Mozilla used early access to Anthropic's Claude Mythos model to systematically discover and patch hundreds of previously unknown vulnerabilities in Firefox, including bugs over 15–20 years old. The effort demonstrates a step-change in AI-assisted vulnerability research, with April 2026 seeing 423 security fixes compared to a monthly baseline of 20–30. The same capability that empowered Mozilla's defenders also signals that adversaries with similar model access could industrialise exploit discovery against open-source software at scale.</description></item><item><title>Fake Claude AI Site Used to Distribute Beagle Backdoor and PlugX Malware</title><link>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/fake-claude-ai-site-used-to-distribute-beagle-backdoor-and-plugx-malware/</link><pubDate>Fri, 08 May 2026 03:12:21 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/fake-claude-ai-site-used-to-distribute-beagle-backdoor-and-plugx-malware/</guid><category>Threat Level: HIGH</category><category>Supply Chain</category><category>Industry News</category><category>LLM Security</category><category>AML.T0047 - ML-Enabled Product or Service</category><category>AML.T0010 - ML Supply Chain Compromise</category><description>Threat actors created a convincing fake website impersonating Anthropic's Claude AI to trick developers into downloading a trojanized installer that deploys the new 'Beagle' backdoor alongside a PlugX malware chain. The campaign specifically targets Claude-Code developers by advertising a fraudulent 'high-performance relay service,' suggesting deliberate targeting of the AI developer community. The attack leverages DLL sideloading via a legitimate signed G Data executable to evade detection while establishing persistent remote access.</description></item><item><title>Malicious Repos Trigger Silent Code Execution in Claude, Cursor, Gemini CLIs</title><link>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/malicious-repos-trigger-silent-code-execution-in-claude-cursor-gemini-clis/</link><pubDate>Fri, 08 May 2026 03:10:50 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/malicious-repos-trigger-silent-code-execution-in-claude-cursor-gemini-clis/</guid><category>Threat Level: HIGH</category><category>LLM Security</category><category>Prompt Injection</category><category>Agentic AI</category><category>Supply Chain</category><category>Research</category><category>AML.T0051 - LLM Prompt Injection</category><category>AML.T0010 - ML Supply Chain Compromise</category><category>AML.T0047 - ML-Enabled Product or Service</category><category>AML.T0043 - Craft Adversarial Data</category><description>A vulnerability class dubbed 'TrustFall' demonstrates that malicious code repositories can trigger arbitrary code execution in AI-assisted developer tools including Claude Code, Cursor CLI, Gemini CLI, and GitHub Copilot CLI, with little to no user interaction required. The attack surface stems from inadequate or easily dismissed warning dialogs that fail to surface the risk of executing untrusted repository content. Developers cloning or opening adversarial repositories are exposed to full host-level compromise through the elevated trust these AI coding agents place in repository-supplied context.</description></item><item><title>Mitiga Labs: MCP Hijack Attack Steals Claude Code OAuth Tokens via Silent Man-in-the-Middle</title><link>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/mcp-hijack-attack-steals-claude-code-oauth-tokens-via-silent-man-in-the-middle/</link><pubDate>Fri, 08 May 2026 03:04:52 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/mcp-hijack-attack-steals-claude-code-oauth-tokens-via-silent-man-in-the-middle/</guid><category>Threat Level: HIGH</category><category>LLM Security</category><category>Agentic AI</category><category>Supply Chain</category><category>Research</category><category>AML.T0010 - ML Supply Chain Compromise</category><category>AML.T0012 - Valid Accounts</category><category>AML.T0047 - ML-Enabled Product or Service</category><category>AML.T0057 - LLM Data Leakage</category><description>Mitiga Labs has disclosed a stealthy attack chain targeting Claude Code's MCP infrastructure, allowing adversaries to silently intercept OAuth tokens by redirecting MCP traffic through attacker-controlled infrastructure. The attack requires only the ability to install a malicious npm package, which modifies ~/.claude.json to insert a proxy and pre-sets trust flags to suppress security prompts. Because the OAuth token grants broad access to all connected SaaS tools, successful exploitation effectively hands attackers a persistent master key to the victim's integrated development environment.</description></item><item><title>Pixel-Level Perturbations Enable Invisible Prompt Injection in Vision-Language Models</title><link>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/pixel-level-perturbations-enable-invisible-prompt-injection-in-vision-language/</link><pubDate>Fri, 08 May 2026 03:03:08 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/pixel-level-perturbations-enable-invisible-prompt-injection-in-vision-language/</guid><category>Threat Level: HIGH</category><category>Prompt Injection</category><category>Adversarial ML</category><category>LLM Security</category><category>Agentic AI</category><category>Research</category><category>AML.T0043 - Craft Adversarial Data</category><category>AML.T0051 - LLM Prompt Injection</category><category>AML.T0015 - Evade ML Model</category><category>AML.T0040 - ML Model Inference API Access</category><category>AML.T0057 - LLM Data Leakage</category><description>Cisco's AI Threat Intelligence team has demonstrated that bounded pixel-level perturbations can recover the attack effectiveness of degraded typographic images against vision-language models (VLMs), enabling hidden prompt injection that bypasses both human review and content filters. The technique works by optimising perturbations against open-source embedding models and transferring results to proprietary systems like GPT-4o and Claude, exposing a cross-model transferability risk. The attack allows adversaries to embed instructions—such as data exfiltration commands—inside images that appear as visual noise to human observers.</description></item><item><title>Prompt Injection Achieves Remote Code Execution in Semantic Kernel Agent Framework</title><link>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/prompt-injection-achieves-rce-in-semantic-kernel-agent-framework/</link><pubDate>Fri, 08 May 2026 03:01:32 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/prompt-injection-achieves-rce-in-semantic-kernel-agent-framework/</guid><category>Threat Level: CRITICAL</category><category>LLM Security</category><category>Prompt Injection</category><category>Agentic AI</category><category>Research</category><category>AML.T0051 - LLM Prompt Injection</category><category>AML.T0047 - ML-Enabled Product or Service</category><category>AML.T0043 - Craft Adversarial Data</category><category>AML.T0057 - LLM Data Leakage</category><description>Microsoft's Defender Security Research Team disclosed two CVEs in Semantic Kernel — a widely-used AI agent orchestration framework — demonstrating how prompt injection can escalate to remote code execution via compromised plugins. The vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-26030 and CVE-2026-25592) expose a systemic risk in the agentic AI layer: because frameworks like Semantic Kernel abstract tool orchestration, a single flaw in how LLM outputs are mapped to system tools can propagate across every application built on that foundation. This research signals a critical shift in AI threat modelling, where prompt injection is no longer a content risk but an execution risk.</description></item><item><title>Unmanaged AI Agents Expose Enterprise Identity Perimeters to Silent Compromise</title><link>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/unmanaged-ai-agents-expose-enterprise-identity-perimeters-to-silent-compromise/</link><pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2026 03:56:03 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/unmanaged-ai-agents-expose-enterprise-identity-perimeters-to-silent-compromise/</guid><category>Threat Level: HIGH</category><category>Agentic AI</category><category>LLM Security</category><category>Regulatory</category><category>Industry News</category><category>AML.T0012 - Valid Accounts</category><category>AML.T0040 - ML Model Inference API Access</category><category>AML.T0047 - ML-Enabled Product or Service</category><category>AML.T0057 - LLM Data Leakage</category><description>Enterprises are deploying AI agents faster than governance frameworks can track them, creating a shadow identity layer that operates outside traditional IAM visibility. These agents run continuously, accumulate permissions opportunistically, and interact with sensitive data at machine speed — largely unmonitored. The structural gap between agent activity and IAM coverage represents a significant and growing attack surface for privilege abuse and data exfiltration.</description></item><item><title>Bleeding Llama Flaw Exposes 300,000 Ollama Servers to Unauthenticated Data Theft</title><link>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/bleeding-llama-flaw-exposes-300000-ollama-servers-to-unauthenticated-data-theft/</link><pubDate>Wed, 06 May 2026 04:16:56 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/bleeding-llama-flaw-exposes-300000-ollama-servers-to-unauthenticated-data-theft/</guid><category>Threat Level: CRITICAL</category><category>LLM Security</category><category>Research</category><category>Industry News</category><category>AML.T0040 - ML Model Inference API Access</category><category>AML.T0057 - LLM Data Leakage</category><category>AML.T0044 - Full ML Model Access</category><category>AML.T0043 - Craft Adversarial Data</category><description>A critical heap out-of-bounds read vulnerability (CVE-2026-7482, CVSS 9.3) in Ollama's GGUF model loader allows unauthenticated remote attackers to exfiltrate sensitive heap memory — including API keys, prompts, and PII — using just three API calls. With approximately 300,000 Ollama instances publicly exposed and no authentication required by default, the attack surface is immediately and broadly exploitable. The vulnerability has been patched in Ollama version 0.17.1, but unpatched internet-facing deployments remain at critical risk.</description></item><item><title>CrowdStrike Researcher Details AI Jailbreaking and Data Poisoning Techniques</title><link>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/crowdstrike-researcher-details-ai-jailbreaking-and-data-poisoning-techniques/</link><pubDate>Wed, 06 May 2026 04:15:58 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/crowdstrike-researcher-details-ai-jailbreaking-and-data-poisoning-techniques/</guid><category>Threat Level: MEDIUM</category><category>LLM Security</category><category>Jailbreaks</category><category>Adversarial ML</category><category>Data Poisoning</category><category>Research</category><category>Industry News</category><category>AML.T0054 - LLM Jailbreak</category><category>AML.T0051 - LLM Prompt Injection</category><category>AML.T0020 - Poison Training Data</category><category>AML.T0043 - Craft Adversarial Data</category><category>AML.T0015 - Evade ML Model</category><description>Joey Melo, Principal Security Researcher at CrowdStrike, outlines his methodology for AI red teaming, focusing on manipulating LLM guardrails through jailbreaking and data poisoning without altering underlying source code. His work, rooted in competitive AI hacking challenges, translates classical adversarial thinking into the emerging field of machine learning security. The profile highlights the growing professionalisation of AI red teaming as organisations seek to harden LLM deployments against real-world manipulation attacks.</description></item><item><title>Mass Scan Reveals Widespread Authentication Failures Across Exposed AI Infrastructure</title><link>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/mass-scan-reveals-widespread-authentication-failures-across-exposed-ai/</link><pubDate>Wed, 06 May 2026 04:15:21 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/mass-scan-reveals-widespread-authentication-failures-across-exposed-ai/</guid><category>Threat Level: HIGH</category><category>LLM Security</category><category>Agentic AI</category><category>Industry News</category><category>Research</category><category>Jailbreaks</category><category>AML.T0040 - ML Model Inference API Access</category><category>AML.T0044 - Full ML Model Access</category><category>AML.T0054 - LLM Jailbreak</category><category>AML.T0057 - LLM Data Leakage</category><category>AML.T0012 - Valid Accounts</category><category>AML.T0047 - ML-Enabled Product or Service</category><description>A scan of over one million exposed AI services found pervasive security failures including absent authentication, leaked API keys, and exposed business logic across self-hosted LLM deployments. Agent management platforms such as Flowise and n8n were discovered internet-exposed without access controls, revealing credential lists and internal workflows. The findings indicate systemic misconfiguration risk as enterprises race to self-host AI infrastructure without applying baseline security practices.</description></item><item><title>Backdoored PyTorch Lightning Package Steals Cloud Credentials from AI Developers</title><link>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/backdoored-pytorch-lightning-package-steals-cloud-credentials-from-ai-developers/</link><pubDate>Tue, 05 May 2026 05:36:41 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/backdoored-pytorch-lightning-package-steals-cloud-credentials-from-ai-developers/</guid><category>Threat Level: HIGH</category><category>Supply Chain</category><category>LLM Security</category><category>Industry News</category><category>AML.T0010 - ML Supply Chain Compromise</category><category>AML.T0018 - Backdoor ML Model</category><category>AML.T0012 - Valid Accounts</category><description>A malicious version of PyTorch Lightning (v2.6.3) was published to PyPI, embedding a hidden execution chain that silently downloads a JavaScript runtime and executes a heavily obfuscated credential-stealing payload dubbed 'ShaiWorm'. The attack targeted AI/ML developers who use this popular deep learning framework, exposing cloud credentials, API keys, browser-stored secrets, and GitHub tokens. The package has since been reverted to a safe version, but any developer who imported the compromised version should rotate all secrets immediately.</description></item><item><title>Pentagon Deploys Classified AI Across Seven Tech Giants for Warfighter Systems</title><link>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/pentagon-deploys-classified-ai-across-seven-tech-giants-for-warfighter-systems/</link><pubDate>Mon, 04 May 2026 03:28:36 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/pentagon-deploys-classified-ai-across-seven-tech-giants-for-warfighter-systems/</guid><category>Threat Level: HIGH</category><category>Agentic AI</category><category>Supply Chain</category><category>Regulatory</category><category>Industry News</category><category>LLM Security</category><category>AML.T0010 - ML Supply Chain Compromise</category><category>AML.T0047 - ML-Enabled Product or Service</category><category>AML.T0040 - ML Model Inference API Access</category><category>AML.T0043 - Craft Adversarial Data</category><category>AML.T0057 - LLM Data Leakage</category><description>The US Department of Defense has formalised agreements with seven major technology companies — including Google, Microsoft, OpenAI, and Amazon Web Services — to integrate AI into classified military networks for battlefield decision support. The move raises significant AI security concerns around human oversight, adversarial manipulation of high-stakes AI systems, and supply chain risks introduced by multiple commercial vendors operating within classified environments. Notably, Anthropic was excluded following a public dispute over AI safety and ethics in warfare.</description></item><item><title>Cross-Machine AI Agent Relay Tool Expands Attack Surface for Developer Environments</title><link>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/cross-machine-ai-agent-relay-tool-expands-attack-surface-for-developer/</link><pubDate>Sun, 03 May 2026 03:31:51 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/cross-machine-ai-agent-relay-tool-expands-attack-surface-for-developer/</guid><category>Threat Level: MEDIUM</category><category>Agentic AI</category><category>Supply Chain</category><category>LLM Security</category><category>Industry News</category><category>AML.T0047 - ML-Enabled Product or Service</category><category>AML.T0010 - ML Supply Chain Compromise</category><category>AML.T0051 - LLM Prompt Injection</category><category>AML.T0040 - ML Model Inference API Access</category><description>Loopsy is an open-source tool enabling cross-machine communication between AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex) and mobile devices via a self-hosted Cloudflare Workers relay. While designed for legitimate developer productivity, the architecture introduces significant attack surface: a relay brokering shell access and AI agent commands across machines is a high-value target for interception, hijacking, or supply chain compromise. Security teams should assess exposure before deploying such tools in sensitive development environments.</description></item><item><title>Desktop Automation CLI Grants AI Agents Deep OS-Level Control</title><link>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/desktop-automation-cli-grants-ai-agents-deep-os-level-control/</link><pubDate>Sun, 03 May 2026 03:30:02 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/desktop-automation-cli-grants-ai-agents-deep-os-level-control/</guid><category>Threat Level: HIGH</category><category>Agentic AI</category><category>LLM Security</category><category>Prompt Injection</category><category>Research</category><category>AML.T0051 - LLM Prompt Injection</category><category>AML.T0047 - ML-Enabled Product or Service</category><category>AML.T0057 - LLM Data Leakage</category><category>AML.T0040 - ML Model Inference API Access</category><description>agent-desktop is an open-source Rust CLI tool that exposes full OS accessibility trees to AI agents, enabling programmatic control of any desktop application without screenshots or browser sandboxing. This dramatically expands the attack surface for agentic AI systems, as a compromised or prompt-injected agent could silently manipulate native applications, exfiltrate data, or perform destructive actions across the host OS. The tool's deterministic element references and structured JSON output make it trivially scriptable, lowering the barrier for AI-driven desktop abuse.</description></item><item><title>Frontier LLMs Now Autonomously Breach Corporate Networks in AISI Cyber Tests</title><link>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/frontier-llms-now-autonomously-breach-corporate-networks-in-aisi-cyber-tests/</link><pubDate>Sat, 02 May 2026 04:50:23 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/frontier-llms-now-autonomously-breach-corporate-networks-in-aisi-cyber-tests/</guid><category>Threat Level: HIGH</category><category>LLM Security</category><category>Agentic AI</category><category>Research</category><category>Industry News</category><category>Regulatory</category><category>AML.T0047 - ML-Enabled Product or Service</category><category>AML.T0040 - ML Model Inference API Access</category><category>AML.T0043 - Craft Adversarial Data</category><description>The UK's AI Security Institute (AISI) found that OpenAI's GPT-5.5 matches Anthropic's Mythos Preview on cybersecurity benchmarks, including a 32-step simulated corporate network intrusion. Both models successfully completed the 'The Last Ones' data-extraction simulation — a first for any AI system — suggesting autonomous offensive cyber capability is a general frontier-model property, not a one-vendor breakthrough. The findings raise urgent questions about responsible release practices and the pace at which LLMs can independently execute multi-stage attacks.</description></item><item><title>Premature AI Agent Deployments Expose Production Systems to Destructive Actions</title><link>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/premature-ai-agent-deployments-expose-production-systems-to-destructive-actions/</link><pubDate>Sat, 02 May 2026 04:45:09 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/premature-ai-agent-deployments-expose-production-systems-to-destructive-actions/</guid><category>Threat Level: HIGH</category><category>Agentic AI</category><category>LLM Security</category><category>Industry News</category><category>AML.T0047 - ML-Enabled Product or Service</category><category>AML.T0051 - LLM Prompt Injection</category><category>AML.T0057 - LLM Data Leakage</category><description>Organisations are deploying AI agents into production environments without adequate security testing, resulting in destructive outcomes such as unintended deletion of production databases. The core risk is excessive agency granted to AI systems before trust boundaries and guardrails are established. This represents a systemic industry failure to apply basic security principles before integrating autonomous AI tooling into critical infrastructure.</description></item><item><title>Anthropic Launches Claude Security to Close AI-Accelerated Exploit Window</title><link>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/anthropic-launches-claude-security-to-close-ai-accelerated-exploit-window/</link><pubDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 07:06:29 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/anthropic-launches-claude-security-to-close-ai-accelerated-exploit-window/</guid><category>Threat Level: HIGH</category><category>LLM Security</category><category>Agentic AI</category><category>Industry News</category><category>Research</category><category>AML.T0047 - ML-Enabled Product or Service</category><category>AML.T0040 - ML Model Inference API Access</category><category>AML.T0043 - Craft Adversarial Data</category><description>Anthropic has released Claude Security in public beta, a dedicated vulnerability scanning product aimed at countering the accelerating threat of AI-powered exploitation exemplified by its own Mythos model. The tool integrates directly into Claude Enterprise, scanning repositories for vulnerabilities, providing confidence-rated findings, and generating targeted patches — compressing the security team-to-engineer remediation cycle from days to a single session. The launch reflects a broader industry acknowledgment that frontier AI models in adversarial hands are fundamentally shortening time-to-exploit, forcing defenders to adopt equivalent AI-native tooling.</description></item><item><title>CVSS 10 Gemini CLI Flaw Turns CI/CD Pipelines Into RCE Attack Vectors</title><link>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/cvss-10-gemini-cli-flaw-turns-ci-cd-pipelines-into-rce-attack-vectors/</link><pubDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 06:54:32 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/cvss-10-gemini-cli-flaw-turns-ci-cd-pipelines-into-rce-attack-vectors/</guid><category>Threat Level: CRITICAL</category><category>LLM Security</category><category>Agentic AI</category><category>Supply Chain</category><category>Prompt Injection</category><category>AML.T0051 - LLM Prompt Injection</category><category>AML.T0010 - ML Supply Chain Compromise</category><category>AML.T0047 - ML-Enabled Product or Service</category><description>Google has patched a maximum-severity (CVSS 10.0) vulnerability in its Gemini CLI tooling that allowed unauthenticated attackers to achieve remote code execution by planting malicious configuration files in workspace directories automatically trusted by the agent in headless/CI mode. The flaw effectively weaponised CI/CD pipelines as supply chain attack paths, bypassing sandbox protections entirely before they could initialise. A secondary issue in '--yolo' mode further enabled prompt injection to trigger unrestricted shell command execution.</description></item><item><title>OpenAI Launches Phishing-Resistant Security Mode for High-Risk ChatGPT Accounts</title><link>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/openai-launches-phishing-resistant-security-mode-for-high-risk-chatgpt-accounts/</link><pubDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 04:42:27 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/openai-launches-phishing-resistant-security-mode-for-high-risk-chatgpt-accounts/</guid><category>Threat Level: MEDIUM</category><category>LLM Security</category><category>Industry News</category><category>Regulatory</category><category>AML.T0012 - Valid Accounts</category><category>AML.T0040 - ML Model Inference API Access</category><category>AML.T0047 - ML-Enabled Product or Service</category><description>OpenAI has introduced Advanced Account Security, an optional hardened authentication mode for ChatGPT and Codex users who face elevated risk of account takeover, including journalists, dissidents, and researchers. The feature enforces passkey or physical security key authentication, eliminates SMS/email recovery routes, and removes OpenAI support team access to recovery options to block social engineering attacks. Members of OpenAI's Trusted Access for Cyber programme will be mandated to enable it or provide equivalent enterprise SSO attestation by June 1.</description></item><item><title>UK AI Security Institute Finds GPT-5.5 Matches Claude Mythos in Cyber Capabilities</title><link>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/uk-ai-security-institute-finds-gpt-5-5-matches-claude-mythos-in-cyber/</link><pubDate>Fri, 01 May 2026 04:37:05 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://gridthegrey.com/posts/uk-ai-security-institute-finds-gpt-5-5-matches-claude-mythos-in-cyber/</guid><category>Threat Level: HIGH</category><category>LLM Security</category><category>Research</category><category>Industry News</category><category>Regulatory</category><category>AML.T0047 - ML-Enabled Product or Service</category><category>AML.T0040 - ML Model Inference API Access</category><category>AML.T0043 - Craft Adversarial Data</category><description>The UK's AI Security Institute has evaluated OpenAI's GPT-5.5 for offensive cybersecurity capabilities, finding it comparable to Anthropic's Claude Mythos model in identifying security vulnerabilities. Unlike Mythos, GPT-5.5 is generally available, meaning its vulnerability-discovery capabilities are accessible to a broad population including malicious actors. This raises significant concerns about the proliferation of AI-assisted exploitation tools at scale.</description></item></channel></rss>