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Miasma Worm Compromises 73 Microsoft NPM Packages for AI Agents

Miasma Worm Compromises 73 Microsoft NPM Packages for AI Agents

ATLAS OWASP CRITICAL Active exploitation · Immediate action required ▲ 8.5 Ars Technica Security

Seventy-three Microsoft-hosted open source packages were compromised with the Miasma credential-stealing worm, which activates specifically when developers open packages inside AI coding agents. The malware, attributed to threat actor TeamPCP, exploits legitimate OIDC token workflows and SLSA provenance attestation to bypass supply-chain integrity checks and spread laterally across cloud infrastructure. This marks the second such compromise of an official Microsoft repository in as many months, indicating a sustained campaign targeting developer toolchains and the AI-assisted development pipeline.

Cisco, Check Point M&A Targets AI Agent Identity Gaps

Cisco, Check Point M&A Targets AI Agent Identity Gaps

ATLAS OWASP MEDIUM Moderate risk · Monitor closely ▲ 6.2 SecurityWeek

May 2026 saw a wave of cybersecurity acquisitions with a clear focus on securing AI agents and LLM infrastructure, including Cisco's ~$400M acquisition of Astrix Security for non-human identity management and Check Point's acquisition of Deepchecks for LLM evaluation and continuous monitoring. Akamai also moved to acquire LayerX for AI usage control and agentic activity visibility across browsers and IDEs. These deals signal that enterprise security vendors are racing to build defensive capabilities around the expanding agentic AI attack surface.

Anthropic Claude Code Prompt Injection Leaks Secrets

Anthropic Claude Code Prompt Injection Leaks Secrets

ATLAS OWASP HIGH Significant risk · Prioritise patching ▲ 9.1 Microsoft Security Blog

Microsoft Threat Intelligence disclosed a vulnerability in Anthropic's Claude Code GitHub Action whereby prompt injection via untrusted GitHub content — issue bodies, PR descriptions, and comments — could cause the AI agent to read sensitive environment variables, including the ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, from /proc/self/environ. The flaw stemmed from inconsistent sandboxing: while subprocess execution paths like Bash were scrubbed of environment variables, the Read tool had no equivalent restriction. Anthropic patched the issue in Claude Code version 2.1.128 by blocking access to sensitive /proc filesystem paths.

Deepfakes and Prompt Injection Top AI Security Threats

Deepfakes and Prompt Injection Top AI Security Threats

ATLAS OWASP HIGH Significant risk · Prioritise patching ▲ 7.2 Dark Reading

Gartner analysts have identified deepfakes and prompt injection as two of four critical emerging threats where attackers currently hold a structural advantage over defenders. The advisory signals growing institutional recognition that AI-native attack vectors are maturing faster than enterprise defenses. Organizations are urged to treat these threats as priority items requiring immediate defensive investment.

AI Worm With Embedded LLM Enables Self-Propagation

AI Worm With Embedded LLM Enables Self-Propagation

ATLAS OWASP HIGH Significant risk · Prioritise patching ▲ 7.5 Schneier on Security

Researchers have prototyped an internet worm that bundles its own large language model, executing it on compromised hosts to enable fully decentralised propagation with no single point of control. The design mirrors John Brunner's 1975 fictional conception of a worm and echoes the destructive potential of WannaCry and NotPetya, but with the added capability of dynamically generating novel attacks by ingesting recent public vulnerability disclosures. The absence of a command-and-control chokepoint makes traditional takedown strategies ineffective, significantly raising the threat posed by AI-augmented malware.

ChatGPT Prompt Injection Enables Data Exfiltration

ChatGPT Prompt Injection Enables Data Exfiltration

ATLAS OWASP MEDIUM Moderate risk · Monitor closely ▲ 7.2 Simon Willison

OpenAI has rolled out 'Lockdown Mode' for ChatGPT personal and self-serve business accounts, a deterministic control designed to block the data exfiltration leg of prompt injection attacks. The feature directly addresses the 'Lethal Trifecta' — the combination of private data access, untrusted content exposure, and an outbound exfiltration channel — by restricting outbound network requests at the infrastructure level rather than relying on AI-evaluated guardrails. Critically, OpenAI's own documentation acknowledges the feature's existence implies that default ChatGPT settings do not robustly prevent determined data exfiltration attacks.

Claude Mythos Unauthorized Access Exposes AI Security

Claude Mythos Unauthorized Access Exposes AI Security

ATLAS OWASP HIGH Significant risk · Prioritise patching ▲ 7.2 The Hacker News

A reported unauthorized access to Anthropic's Claude Mythos model within hours of its limited technical preview highlights acute security risks as agentic AI is deployed across classified defense and intelligence networks. The incident underscores vulnerabilities specific to AI infrastructure in high-security environments, including training data poisoning, access control failures, and cross-domain classification boundary erosion. Secure IT infrastructure, governed access, and cross-domain data controls are identified as prerequisites for safe AI deployment at mission scale.

Microsoft Scout Agent Vulnerable to Prompt Injection

Microsoft Scout Agent Vulnerable to Prompt Injection

ATLAS OWASP MEDIUM Moderate risk · Monitor closely ▲ 6.5 HN AI Security

Microsoft has launched Scout, an always-on autonomous AI agent built on the OpenClaw framework that operates across Microsoft 365 apps including Teams, Outlook, OneDrive, and SharePoint with its own Entra identity. The agent's persistent, unsupervised access to email, calendar, chat, and external systems via MCP creates a broad new attack surface for prompt injection, privilege abuse, and data exfiltration. As an experimental release with limited deployment controls, security teams should treat Scout as a high-risk agentic surface requiring careful governance before broad adoption.

Excessive Agency in AI Agents Enables Enterprise Breaches

Excessive Agency in AI Agents Enables Enterprise Breaches

ATLAS OWASP HIGH Significant risk · Prioritise patching ▲ 7.2 Dark Reading

Enterprises deploying AI agents with elevated permissions and minimal oversight face compounding security risks as agentic systems gain the ability to take real-world actions with limited human intervention. The attack surface expands dramatically when agents can access APIs, execute code, and chain decisions autonomously, making containment of a compromise significantly harder. Security teams must implement least-privilege principles and robust monitoring before agentic deployments scale beyond their ability to govern.

Google Gemini Android Hijacked by Indirect Prompt Injection

Google Gemini Android Hijacked by Indirect Prompt Injection

ATLAS OWASP HIGH Significant risk · Prioritise patching ▲ 9.1 The Hacker News

SafeBreach researcher Or Yair demonstrated that malicious text embedded in WhatsApp, Slack, SMS, or Signal notifications could trigger indirect prompt injection against Google Gemini's Android Utilities feature, causing the assistant to execute real device actions without user awareness. A novel bypass technique called 'Fake Context Alignment' defeated Google's post-patch authorization checks by exploiting multilingual obfuscation and muted hyperlinks to trick victims into authorising sensitive actions. Google has patched the issue, but the research exposes a fundamentally large attack surface where any app capable of pushing a notification becomes a potential injection vector.

Adversa AI: 89% of AI Agents Fail Security Tests

Adversa AI: 89% of AI Agents Fail Security Tests

ATLAS OWASP HIGH Significant risk · Prioritise patching ▲ 8.2 SecurityWeek

Adversa AI's AI Risk Quadrant report evaluated 100 AI agents across ten categories, finding that only 11 qualify as both capable and well-defended. The research identifies a structural 'power-protection inversion' where the most capable agents also present the widest attack surface, driven by a 'lethal trifecta' of private data access, exposure to untrusted content, and outbound action capability. Computer and coding agents showed the most severe exposure, raising urgent concerns about autonomous agent deployment in enterprise environments.

Google Gemini Voice Prompt Injection via Notifications

Google Gemini Voice Prompt Injection via Notifications

ATLAS OWASP HIGH Significant risk · Prioritise patching ▲ 8.2 Dark Reading

A prompt injection vulnerability in Google Gemini's voice assistant allows attackers to embed malicious instructions within device notifications, which the assistant then processes as legitimate commands. This attack vector enables social engineering, unauthorized actions, and potential data exfiltration without direct user interaction with the malicious payload. The flaw highlights the growing risk of indirect prompt injection in ambient AI assistants that consume untrusted content from the surrounding environment.

Shadow-AI Apps Expose Corporate Data via Misconfiguration

Shadow-AI Apps Expose Corporate Data via Misconfiguration

ATLAS OWASP HIGH Significant risk · Prioritise patching ▲ 7.2 The Hacker News

A Red Access investigation found over 2,000 corporate applications built on AI-assisted 'vibe-coding' platforms publicly accessible on the open internet, many containing sensitive business data with no access controls. These shadow-built apps connect directly to production systems — CRMs, ERPs, BI tools — creating a new class of unaudited attack surface invisible to conventional security stacks. Traditional controls such as CASB, DLP, and EDR are structurally blind to this threat because the risk originates at the application layer, not the identity or network layer.

Claude Sandbox Escape Enables Credential Exfiltration

Claude Sandbox Escape Enables Credential Exfiltration

ATLAS OWASP MEDIUM Moderate risk · Monitor closely ▲ 7.2 Simon Willison

Anthropic has published detailed documentation of its sandboxing architecture across Claude.ai, Claude Code, and Claude Cowork, including disclosure of a previously identified credential exfiltration vector via the api.anthropic.com/v1/files endpoint. The writeup covers process-level isolation technologies including gVisor, Seatbelt, Bubblewrap, and full VM approaches, and candidly acknowledges security gaps that were missed. This transparency is notable for the agentic AI space, where sandbox documentation is typically sparse and trust is difficult to calibrate.

ChatGPT Markdown Injection Enables Phishing in Web Summarizer

ChatGPT Markdown Injection Enables Phishing in Web Summarizer

ATLAS OWASP HIGH Significant risk · Prioritise patching ▲ 8.5 The Hacker News

Permiso Security has disclosed ChatGPhish, a vulnerability in ChatGPT's web summarisation feature that allows attacker-controlled Markdown payloads embedded in third-party pages to render phishing links, spoofed alerts, and QR codes directly within ChatGPT's trusted UI. The attack requires no user interaction beyond asking ChatGPT to summarise a malicious page, and can exfiltrate IP addresses, User-Agent strings, and Referer headers via auto-fetched remote images. The technique significantly expands the phishing attack surface beyond email into everyday AI-assisted browsing workflows, posing a particular risk in enterprise environments.

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