LIVE FEED
HIGH LLM Reasoning Trace Theft via Encrypted Block Replay Attack // FIRST LOOK OpenAI and AWS Launch Daybreak Red and Blue on Amazon Bedrock // CRITICAL CVE-2026-55040: SharePoint RCE Chain Found via AI Agent // FIRST LOOK OpenAI Releases GPT-5.6 Cyber for Approved Security Partners // HIGH GhostJacking Attack Hijacks AI Agents via Security Alerts // FIRST LOOK Cactus Releases Needle 2 Agentic LLM for IoT and Edge Devices // HIGH Google APK Flaw Enables Agent-to-Agent Supply Chain Attack // CRITICAL CVE-2026-41679: Paperclip AI RCE via Malicious Agent Import // FIRST LOOK Anthropic Enables Claude Code Auto Mode by Default for Pro Users // CRITICAL CVE-2026-58073: Veeam and Terraform MCP Critical Flaws Patched //
GITHUB-COPILOT

Github-Copilot

4 reports
All LLM Security Agentic AI Industry News Supply Chain Research Prompt Injection First Look: Security Regulatory Jailbreaks Adversarial ML Model Theft Data Poisoning Deep Signal Intelligence Report AI Governance AI Security AI Security Tools Identity & Access Management Security Operations
Microsoft Copilot Super App Merges Chat, Code, and Agents

Microsoft Copilot Super App Merges Chat, Code, and Agents

FIRST LOOK ATLAS OWASP HIGH Significant risk · Prioritise patching ▲ 7.2 The Verge AI

Microsoft has confirmed a Copilot 'super app' launching in 2026 that consolidates chat, GitHub Copilot coding, Cowork collaboration, and agentic Autopilot capabilities into a single unified platform spanning consumer and commercial users. The convergence of these surfaces into one application dramatically expands the blast radius of any successful prompt injection or account compromise, as an attacker who subverts the LLM layer could pivot across coding pipelines, autonomous task execution, and business workflows simultaneously. Defenders should treat this consolidation as a significant privilege-escalation risk, where a single vulnerability in the AI layer now potentially unlocks lateral movement across the entire Microsoft productivity stack.

AI Coding Agents Exploited via Hallucinated Package Names

AI Coding Agents Exploited via Hallucinated Package Names

ATLAS OWASP HIGH Significant risk · Prioritise patching ▲ 8.5 BleepingComputer

Researchers from Tel Aviv University, Technion, and Intuit have demonstrated that AI coding agents across tools like Cursor, Copilot, and Gemini CLI predictably hallucinate package, domain, and repository names that attackers can pre-register to deliver malicious code. The attack—variously branded slopsquatting, phantom squatting, and HalluSquatting—requires no phishing, no stolen credentials, and no direct user interaction, only an automated agent with permission to fetch external resources. Because agents handle delivery autonomously and hallucinations are reproducible at up to 100% consistency, the technique scales to botnet-level compromise without traditional malware infrastructure.

GitHub Releases Copilot Agentic Harness Evaluation

GitHub Releases Copilot Agentic Harness Evaluation

FIRST LOOK ATLAS OWASP MEDIUM Moderate risk · Monitor closely ▲ 6.2 GitHub Blog

GitHub has published an evaluation of its Copilot agentic harness, detailing how the orchestration layer performs across multiple underlying models and coding tasks — effectively documenting the architecture of an autonomous, multi-step code generation and execution system. For defenders, this transparency reveals an orchestration surface where prompt injection, supply chain manipulation, and model-switching logic can be targeted across a broader set of model backends than previously understood. Security teams should treat the harness itself as a critical trust boundary, since compromising task routing or model selection logic could silently redirect agentic workflows to less-safe or adversary-controlled model endpoints.

Comment Injection Attacks Hit Claude Code, Gemini, Copilot

Comment Injection Attacks Hit Claude Code, Gemini, Copilot

ATLAS OWASP HIGH Significant risk · Prioritise patching ▲ 8.2 SecurityWeek

A researcher has disclosed a novel prompt injection attack technique dubbed 'Comment and Control,' demonstrating that popular AI coding agents — including Claude Code, Gemini CLI, and GitHub Copilot Agents — can be manipulated through malicious instructions embedded in source code comments. The attack exploits the tendency of agentic coding tools to process and act upon contextual content within files they are tasked to read or modify. This represents a meaningful escalation in the risk surface of AI-assisted software development workflows.

◉ AI THREAT BRIEFING

Stay ahead of the threat.

Twice-weekly digest of critical AI security developments — every story mapped to MITRE ATLAS and OWASP LLM Top 10. Free.

No spam. Unsubscribe anytime.