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Microsoft Copilot Super App Merges Chat, Code, and Agents

Microsoft Copilot Super App Merges Chat, Code, and Agents

FIRST LOOK ATLAS OWASP HIGH Significant risk · Prioritise patching ▲ 7.2 The Verge AI

Microsoft has confirmed a Copilot 'super app' launching in 2026 that consolidates chat, GitHub Copilot coding, Cowork collaboration, and agentic Autopilot capabilities into a single unified platform spanning consumer and commercial users. The convergence of these surfaces into one application dramatically expands the blast radius of any successful prompt injection or account compromise, as an attacker who subverts the LLM layer could pivot across coding pipelines, autonomous task execution, and business workflows simultaneously. Defenders should treat this consolidation as a significant privilege-escalation risk, where a single vulnerability in the AI layer now potentially unlocks lateral movement across the entire Microsoft productivity stack.

Perplexity Launches Personal Computer AI Agent for Windows PCs

Perplexity Launches Personal Computer AI Agent for Windows PCs

FIRST LOOK ATLAS OWASP HIGH Significant risk · Prioritise patching ▲ 8.2 The Verge AI

Perplexity has expanded its Personal Computer agentic tool to Windows, enabling a locally-run AI agent that can access files, Office 365 apps, and the web on behalf of enterprise users. This significantly expands the attack surface for defenders: a compromised or manipulated agent running with local system access can exfiltrate files, execute unauthorised actions, and pivot across cloud-connected Microsoft 365 services. Security teams should treat this as a high-privilege process requiring the same scrutiny as endpoint detection tools, with particular attention to prompt injection via locally-processed documents.

Microsoft Copilot MCP Tool Poisoning Enables Data Exfiltration

Microsoft Copilot MCP Tool Poisoning Enables Data Exfiltration

ATLAS OWASP HIGH Significant risk · Prioritise patching ▲ 9.1 The Hacker News

Microsoft researchers have demonstrated how attackers can embed hidden instructions inside MCP tool descriptions to covertly redirect AI agents into exfiltrating sensitive business data. Because each individual action the agent takes appears legitimate — using approved tools and the user's own permissions — default security controls generate no alerts. The attack exploits a fundamental design tension in MCP: tool descriptions simultaneously carry operational instructions and attacker-controlled data, collapsing a critical trust boundary.

Microsoft Scout Agent Vulnerable to Prompt Injection

Microsoft Scout Agent Vulnerable to Prompt Injection

ATLAS OWASP MEDIUM Moderate risk · Monitor closely ▲ 6.5 HN AI Security

Microsoft has launched Scout, an always-on autonomous AI agent built on the OpenClaw framework that operates across Microsoft 365 apps including Teams, Outlook, OneDrive, and SharePoint with its own Entra identity. The agent's persistent, unsupervised access to email, calendar, chat, and external systems via MCP creates a broad new attack surface for prompt injection, privilege abuse, and data exfiltration. As an experimental release with limited deployment controls, security teams should treat Scout as a high-risk agentic surface requiring careful governance before broad adoption.

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