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HIGH Shostack's LLM Threat Model Responds to Hugging Face Attack // HIGH Naming Error Lets Anthropic AI Models Attack Real Company // HIGH Israel-Linked Fake Think Tank Targets LLM Training Data // CRITICAL GitHub Copilot Autofix Introduced CI/CD Injection in Snowflake // CRITICAL Claude Agents Create Self-Replicating Malware in Turf War // FIRST LOOK Anthropic MCP Server Security Risks and Secrets Exposure Explained // HIGH OpenAI Disbands Preparedness Team Amid IPO Safety Concerns // FIRST LOOK AWS AgentCore Observability Brings Multi-Cloud AI Agent Monitoring // FIRST LOOK OpenAI Astra Launches with Critical-Level Cyber Evaluation Controls // HIGH Kimsuky Runs Offline LLMs to Sharpen Phishing, Build Malware //
TOOL-POISONING

Tool-Poisoning

2 reports
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GhostSplice MCP Attack Splits Prompts to Exfiltrate SSH Keys

GhostSplice MCP Attack Splits Prompts to Exfiltrate SSH Keys

ATLAS OWASP HIGH Significant risk · Prioritise patching ▲ 8.5 The Hacker News

ASSET Research Group has disclosed GhostSplice, a technique that fragments malicious instructions across multiple Model Context Protocol (MCP) server channels to evade AI coding assistant safety filters and trigger secret exfiltration. By splitting a theft request into individually innocuous pieces placed in tool descriptions and tool results, the attack raised average model compliance from 42% to 82% across eleven tested models. The research highlights that host-side safety controls matter as much as model-level refusals, with the same model behaving differently across coding clients.

Microsoft Copilot MCP Tool Poisoning Enables Data Exfiltration

Microsoft Copilot MCP Tool Poisoning Enables Data Exfiltration

ATLAS OWASP HIGH Significant risk · Prioritise patching ▲ 9.1 The Hacker News

Microsoft researchers have demonstrated how attackers can embed hidden instructions inside MCP tool descriptions to covertly redirect AI agents into exfiltrating sensitive business data. Because each individual action the agent takes appears legitimate — using approved tools and the user's own permissions — default security controls generate no alerts. The attack exploits a fundamental design tension in MCP: tool descriptions simultaneously carry operational instructions and attacker-controlled data, collapsing a critical trust boundary.

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